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Although the discipline of psychology, in its con-
temporary form, is only a century old, psychology's 
historical antecedents reach back to the beginnings 
of civilization. Whether defined as the study of the 
soul or the study of human faculties, as it was in 
earlier times, or as the study of consciousness, mind, 
or behavior, as it has been over the past hundred 
years, psychology has dealt with some of the fun-
damental questions and issues pertaining to the func-
tions, processes, and mechanisms of human and 
animal nature. 
Like all thought and action, psychology's theories 
and methods-as well as its professional practices-
have reflected the historical and cultural contexts in 
which they have emerged. In turn, these theories and 
methods have been seminal in the development of 
other humanistic and social scientific disciplines, 
which have often looked to psychology for insights 
regarding the nature and potential of humans and 
other animals. As a result, psychology has been 
one of the fundamental disciplines in the modern, 
twentieth-century academy, especially in the United 
States. Consequently, an understanding of the disci-
pline of psychology will provide access to some of 
the basic orientations and concerns of the cultures 
from which modern psychology has emerged as well 
as an introduction to some of the basic premises of 
the academic disciplines that are related to it. Despite 
its current centrality, however, it is possible that 
psychology may be dismembered and perhaps recon-
structed in the coming decades. If this occurs, it 
will probably be in response to changing cultural 
concerns, new demands from other disciplines, and 
the diverse trajectories of psychology's own varied 
internal developments. 
I. The Historical Background of Psychology 
In 1979, modern scientific psychology celebrated its 
centennial, as dated from the symbolic founding of 
Wilhelm Wundt's psychological laboratory at Leipzig 
University in Germany. Wundt's "new psychology" 
represented a blending of subject matter from the 
old philosophical psychology (which emphasized 
consciousness and mentality) with new techniques 
(especially experimental methods) derived largely 
from physics and physiology. Although Wundt's own 
program for psychology included the nonexper-
imental study of the higher mental processes, it was 
the experimental study of the lower (sensory and 
perceptual) processes that established psychology as 
a scientific discipline, especially in the United States, 
where individuals such as William James, G Stanley 
Hall, and James McKeen Cattell introduced their 
students and colleagues to the new kind of psy-
chology in the 1880s. 
Although this field of study focused at first upon 
the laws governing the sensory and perceptual pro-
cesses of human beings (as revealed primarily in the 
study of adult White males), by the turn of the cen-
tury psychologists were studying a broader range of 
topics, human beings, and species, both as a result 
of developments within the field itself and as a result 
of pressure from the public at large. For instance, 
widespread popular curiosity regarding the sorts of 
psychic phenomena studied by the new, competing 
field of psychical research (now known as para-
psychology) had something to do with bringing 
women, children, and other subjects outside the cat-
egory of adult White males within the purview of 
psychologists, and it also had something to do with 
extending the scope of psychology to include the 
experimental study of hypnosis, suggestion, emotion, 
motivation, the psychology of belief, and abnormal 
psychology. 
At the same time, the practical needs of educators 
and social reformers (both inside and outside the 
field. of psychology) led to the development and 
application of psychological knowledge in a variety 
of social settings. In the United States, both the 
extension of the public school system of education 
and the First World War, by increasing the demand 
for the valid and reliable assessment of students 
and soldiers, helped to spur the development and 
popularity of "mental testing." Counseling and other 
types of clinical psychology and psychotherapy, as 
they are known today, did not emerge until later, in 
the 1930s and thereafter, in response to social needs 
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felt during the Depression and in the aftermath of 
the Second World War. 
By the 1950s, psychology had assumed the basic 
shape in which it is found today, at least in the United 
States, as both a well-established academic discipline 
and a full-fledged profession. Although most uni-
versities had instituted psychology departments by 
the early twentieth century, it was only in the 1950s 
that psychology consolidated its central position in 
the academy and that psychologists established a firm 
hold upon major roles in the public workforce. 
The success of psychology and psychologists in 
both academic and nonacademic settings over the 
subsequent decades is perhaps most succinctly, if 
indirectly, indicated by the rapid increase in mem-
bership in the American Psychological Association 
(APA). Founded in 1892, with 31 original members, 
the APA had grown from 127 members in 1900 to 228 
in 1910, 338 in 1920, 1,101 in 1930, 2,739 in 1940, 
and 7 ,272 in 1950. Its growth from 1920 to 1950 
was thus quite impressive. By 1960, however, the 
membership of the APA had more than doubled to 
18,215; by 1970, there were 30,839 members; by 
1980, 50,933; and by July 1990, 70,266 (American 
Psychological Association 1990). These numbers are 
all the more remarkable when one considers that 
since the 1970s many United States psychologists 
have been leaving or refraining from joining the 
APA, as they have evolved independent professional 
organizations associated with their own specialized 
subfields, and as a new general organization for psy-
chologists came into existence in the latter portion 
of the 1980s. 
2. The Subject Matters of Psychology 
Although the American Psychological Association is 
no longer the sole general professional organization 
for United States psychologists, much less for psy-
chologists from other countries, its divisions give a 
fair indication of the rich variety of concerns and 
types of expertise represented by the discipline and 
profession of psychology. By the late 1980s, there 
were 45 different divisions in the APA, providing 
professional support for psychologists whose scien-
tific and professional interests range from exper-
imental psychology to clinical psychology; from 
evaluation, measurement, and assessment to human-
istic psychology and health psychology; from 
military, business, and consumer psychology to edu-
cational psychology, exercise and sport psychology, 
and peace psychology; from children and youth ser-
vices to adulthood and aging; from physiological 
psychology to the psychology of art; from the history 
and philosophy of psychology to human engineering 
and psychopharmacology; from mental retardation 
and other disabilities to lesbian and gay issues; from 
the media to the law; and across an ever-growing 
spectrum of human problems and therapies. In sum, 
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the number of APA divisions has more than doubled 
(from 19 to 46) since 1945, when the APA adopted a 
divisional structure in an attempt to keep "pure" and 
"applied" psychologists together-and yet separ-
ate-within the same organization (Hilgard 1987 
pp. 756--62). 
Despite the APA's tolerance for diversity at the 
divisional level, the tension between its two major 
factions, which inspired its divisional structure in the 
first place, still remains. Today, however, the tables 
are turned. The "applied" psychologists are now in 
the clear majority and are perceived to be in control 
of the APA. Although this is not entirely the case, 
the tension between these two camps-roughly 
speaking, between psychological scientists and psy-
chological practitioners-led in 1988 to the trans-
formation of a relatively small independent interest 
group into a new psychological organization, the 
American Psychological Society (APS). As of January 
1990, this new organization had attracted some 
11,000 members, and the APS is just one of many 
alternative professional organizations for psychol-
ogists in the United States! 
The other alternative organizations give a further 
sense of both the diversity and quantity of psy-
chologists. They range in focus from the Association 
for Humanistic Psychology (with 5,000 members) to 
the intensely scientific Psychonomic Society (with 
2,400 members). Even a partial listing of these organ-
izations fills six pages in the annual Encyclopedia of 
Associations (Burek 1991). In addition, many psy-
chologists belong to organizations that include scien-
tists and professionals from other fields: for instance, 
organizations representing those interested in animal 
behavior, cognitive science, counseling, neuro-
psychology, organizational behavior, and visual 
science. Finally, it is important to acknowledge that 
there are many international organizations of psy-
chologists (including the International Union of Psy-
chological Science), and that in many countries other 
than the United States psychologists have founded 
their own national associations. In fact, the rate of 
growth in the membership of many of these associ-
ations has surpassed even the APA's remarkable rate 
of growth, though the APA remains the largest single 
national association. 
Another indication of the efflorescence of psy-
chology is given in Ulrich's International Periodicals 
Directory (Popilskis 1990) in which it takes 32 pages 
of triple-columned, small print to list all the journals 
of the field, exclusive of "Medical Science-Psy-
chiatry and Neurology." 
Yet another means of estimating the richness and 
diversity of the field and profession of psychology 
is to review the chapter headings in introductory 
psychology textbooks. Although this will give only a 
very general map of the subject areas of the disci-
pline, this map should be a useful guide for those 
outside the discipline. 
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Before reviewing this map, an important pre-
liminary point is that the map of psychology is both 
central to and reflective of the larger disciplinary and 
interdisciplinary map of twentieth-century academia. 
In the United States, at least, disciplines have typi-
cally been categorized into the arts and humanities, 
the social sciences, and the natural sciences. Psy-
chology is distinctive in that it is rooted, in significant 
ways, in each of these domains. This has caused 
endless debates among those who feel that 
psychology's continued affiliation with all three of its 
roots is a sign of the discipline's immaturity, but from 
another perspective this lack of narrow, pre-emptive 
definition is simply a reflection of the multiplicity 
and complexity of psychology's legitimate subject 
matters. 
In any case, not only did psychology's earlier form 
(as philosophical psychology) come from the humani-
ties, but its on-going central concern with mentality 
and subjectivity (by no means shared by all psy-
chologists) reaffirms this historical linkage. This con-
cern assumes different shapes as many contemporary 
psychologists focus upon a variety of traditional 
humanistic issues. For instance, such topics as per-
sonality, self-identity, the meaning of life, the role 
of values and religion, and the construction of one's 
own "life story" illustrate the substantive, humanistic 
issues that many psychologists feel are susceptible to 
psychological modes of analysis. In turn, many of 
these modes of analysis can be traced to psychology's 
humanistic heritage. 
At the same time, other psychologists take a 
strongly social scientific approach to some of the 
same topics as well as to the genesis, maintenance, 
and alteration of norms, categories of understanding, 
emotional reactions, and other forms of social 
behavior. In recent decades, in fact, the social dimen-
sions of psychological phenomena-including the 
discipline of psychology itself-have received an 
unusual amount of scrutiny. Ironically, this helped 
to bring about something of a crisis for social psy-
chology in particular and for psychologists in general. 
This period of crisis, now considerably abated, was 
associated in the 1970s with the rise to prominence 
of Kuhn's (1970) notion of "scientific revolutions," 
with their attendant reigning "paradigms." A small 
army of scholars applied Kuhn's analysis of science 
to the history of psychology, trying to determine if 
psychology enjoyed paradigmatic status as a mature 
science. They generally concluded, instead, that it 
suffered from its "preparadigmatic" condition. 
Although these episodes in the recent history of 
psychology helped to exorcise some of the ghosts of 
naive empiricism, they are now fading into memory 
as psychology-at least in the United States-settles 
into a period of renewed confidence, in which mul-
tiple metaphors and models rather than a universal 
paradigm provide guidance for a readily admitted 
and largely accepted variety of psychological theories 
and practices. Many of these metaphors and models, 
even outside the domain of social scientific 
psychology, remain resolutely social in character (see 
Leary 1990). 
Besides humanistic and social scientific ap-
proaches, psychology has also boasted a biological 
or natural scientific orientation. Since the very begin-
ning of modern scientific psychology, which grew out 
of "psychophysics" and "physiological psychology," 
the physical correlates and biological nature of psy-
chological phenomena have been studied. Even in 
the heyday of behaviorist psychology, from the 1920s 
through the 1950s, specifically biological psychology 
(including sensory and neurological psychology) was 
pursued by some of the discipline's finest scientists. 
It was not, however, as central as some wished it to 
be. In recent decades, despite the "cognitive revo-
lution" in psychology (Gardner 1987), this relative 
neglect has been overcome, as physiological and 
biological psychologists have strongly advanced their 
subdiscipline. Indeed, some of them have even 
brought traditional humanistic and social scientific 
topics within the purview of biologically oriented 
psychology (e.g., Buss 1991) and attempted to link 
physiology with cognition in various "connectionist" 
models (e.g., Rumelhardt et al. 1986). Such efforts 
have captured the interest of many, though they have 
also drawn the skepticism of others (e.g., Pinker and 
Mehler 1989). 
The basic point of this rapid and very general 
survey of the large domains represented by psy-
chology-the humanistic, social scientific, and nat-
ural scientific domains-is that psychology is a 
multifaceted discipline that deals with multiple and 
sometimes conflicting aspects of human and animal 
nature. In the typical introductory psychology text-
book, this multiplicity is portrayed as extending 
across the major subfields discussed below. 
2.1 Biological Foundations 
Without a doubt, three of the most important books 
in the history of modern psychology are Darwin's On 
the Origin of Species (1859), Fechner's Elements of 
Psychophysics (1860), and Wundt's Principles of 
Physiological Psychology (1874). Each, in a variety 
of ways, helped to establish the biological foun-
dations of modern psychology. 
More than is sometimes realized, Darwin's evo-
lutionary biology set the framework within which 
laypersons, scientists, and practitioners have pon-
dered psychological phenomena over the past 
c:ntury. In erasing the hard lines that once separated 
different species, Darwin generated a tradition of 
t~inking and research that led to the theories and 
discoveries of such individuals as G J Romanes, C 
LI.oyd Morgan, John B Watson, Robert M Yerkes, 
Niko Tinbergen, and Konrad Lorenz. In other 
words, he stimulated the creation of the modern 
fields of comparative psychology and ethology, which 
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study the commonalities and differences in behavior, 
including instinctual or "fixed action" patterns of 
behavior, across species (for contemporary de-
velopments in these fields, see Dewsbury 1989). 
Similarly, in focusing attention upon the impor-
tance of the functions of behavior, Darwin influenced 
the development of a functional approach to psy-
chology: an approach that focuses primarily upon 
the functional utility, or consequences, of cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioral processes rather than 
upon their "essential nature." This functional 
approach has been represented by William James, 
James Mark Baldwin, John Dewey, Edward L 
Thorndike, Robert S Woodworth, Edouard Clapa-
rede, Jean Piaget, Lev Vygotsky, BF Skinner, and 
(in one way or another) the majority of contemporary 
United States psychologists. 
Finally, in his discussions of the fundamental roles 
played in evolutionary history by sexual selection 
and the expression of emotions (see also Darwin 
1871, 1872), Darwin not only fostered comparative 
psychology and ethology, but also triggered the 
Freudian revolution, which began as a radically new 
way of conceiving and treating human dysfunctions 
and has ended up permeating cultural and pro-
fessional modes of thought. As a result, whatever the 
failings of psychoanalysis per se, Freudian concepts 
(and their Darwinian presuppositions) are now part 
of "common sense." (On Darwin's influence upon 
Freud, see Ritvo 1990.) 
Fechner's contributions to psychology were less 
monumental in scope, but for sensory and perceptual 
psychology, they have been no less significant. Along 
with E H Weber, Hermann von Helmholtz, and 
Ewald Hering, Fechner elaborated methods-and 
made discoveries-regarding the reliable, quan-
titative relationships between sensory stimuli on the 
one hand, and psychological sensations and per-
ceptions on the other. In doing so, he helped to 
establish the foundation upon which twentieth cen-
tury "sensory science" has grown. Without question, 
it was basic research like Fechner's that proved the 
possibility of a rigorously scientific (i.e., exper-
imental and quantitative) psychology. The sub-
sequent tradition of sensory and perceptual research 
is rich and broad. It includes the work of such indi-
viduals as Edward B Titchener, Christine Ladd-
Franklin, Max Wertheimer, E G Boring, Georg von 
Bekesy, S S Stevens, James J Gibson, Eleanor J 
Gibson, Leo M Hurvich, and Dorothea Jameson, 
who have made important contributions to our 
understanding of the nature and processes of sen-
sation and perception (see Hochberg 1979 for an 
analytic survey): 
Wundt took Fechner's "psychophysics," combined 
it with elements of Darwin's evolutionary theory 
and Helmholtz's sensory physiology, and initiated 
"physiological psychology." Carried up to the 
present day, this tradition accounts for the neuro-
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physiological and biological research that is almost 
invariably reviewed in the first substantive chapter 
of psychology textbooks. This research attempts to 
explain the physical underpinnings of cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioral phenomena, including the 
evolutionary, genetic, sensory, and perceptual 
phenomena that interested Darwin and Fechner. 
In this tradition, Charles Sherrington, Walter B 
Cannon, Karl Lashley, Donald 0 Hebb, AR Luria, 
Frank Beach, Brenda Milner, Karl Pribram, James 
Olds, and Neal Miller, among many others, have 
made important contributions (see Thompson and 
Robinson 1979). The conceptual products of their 
labor have entered public consciousness through dis-
cussions of reflexes, biofeedback, "split brain" (left-
brain, right-brain) phenomena, endorphins and 
pleasure centers in the brain, biological rhythms, 
REM (rapid eye movement) sleep, PMS (premenstrual 
syndrome), and neurotransmitters. For an area of 
psychology that was relatively neglected during much 
of the behaviorist era in psychology (c. 1920-55), 
physiological psychology has had a large following 
and impact since that time. 
2.2 Learning 
From the very beginning of scientific psychology, 
individuals such as William James (1890) emphasized 
the importance of the kind of learning that leads to 
"habits." This emphasis upon learning as revealed 
in repetitious thoughts, feelings, and behaviors has 
typified much of United States psychology since that 
time. In combination with an emphasis upon the 
reinforcing quality of the consequences of behavior, 
mentioned in the previous section, this led to a dis-
tinctively functional approach to learning (or habit 
formation) in the United States. 
Edward L Thorndike (1911), James's student, per-
formed the classic experiments that led to the for-
mulation of "the law of effect," according to which 
the satisfaction or discomfort (pleasure or pain) 
resulting from a behavioral response is assumed to 
strengthen or weaken the probability of that response 
in similar situations in the future. Later, Skinner 
(1938) developed his own version of the Jaw of effect, 
a version in which "reinforcers" are defined by their 
correlation to behavior, without reference to 
pleasure or pain as explanatory causes. In the 1960s, 
this "Skinnerian" or "operant" approach to learn-
ing-and its application in "behavior modification"-
became popular as a means of bringing about change 
in individual behavior. To this day, especially in the 
United States, Skinnerian psychology has made a 
difference in how many people (inside and outside 
of psychology) think about-and go about-the pro-
cess of "shaping behavior" in childrearing, classroom 
teaching, work management, mental hospitals, and 
other situations (see O'Leary and O'Leary 1972). 
A different, reflex-based approach to learning 
came from the research of Pavlov (1927), a Russian 
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physiologist who explored how new ("conditioned") 
reflexes are formed in association with natural 
("unconditioned") reflexes. Without fully adequate 
knowledge, the United States psychologist John B 
Watson (1916a) argued in his 1915 presidential 
address to the APA that this sort of "conditioning" is 
the primary mechanism of learning. Given Watson's 
notoriety as the founder of United States "behavior-
ism" (the school of psychologists who insist that 
psychology can be scientific only to the extent that it 
studies observable behavior), it is not surprising that 
his advocacy helped to establish "Pavlovian" or 
"classical" conditioning as a major theory of learning 
in twentieth-century psychology. 
Before too many years passed, however, it became 
clear that classical conditioning could not explain a 
great many learned behaviors. In addition to 
Skinner, "neo-behaviorists" such as EC Tolman and 
Clark Hull pointed out the limitations of a strictly 
reflex-based approach to learning. This led to various 
attempts to develop a "two-factor" approach to 
learning (e.g., Rescorla and Solomon 1967) and to a 
continuing debate about the exact nature of, and 
relations between, "classical" and "operant" forms 
of learning. 
In recent decades, several trends have become 
apparent, foreshadowed (respectively) by the work 
of Hull (1943) and Tolman (1948). First, there has 
been a notable increase in the study of the biological 
conditions and limitations of learning (see Matthies 
1989). Second, there has been a considerable 
increase of interest regarding the role of cognition in 
learning, even in animal learning (see Estes 1975-
78). This interest is apparent in social learning 
theory, which emphasizes observational learning, or 
"vicarious conditioning" (Bandura 1977b). This new 
cognitively oriented approach-like classical con-
ditioning and operant conditioning in earlier dec-
ades-has influenced the development and use of 
therapeutic techniques (see Wilson and O'Leary 
1980). Its rise in popularity has been correlated with 
a shift in research from the earlier indirect study of 
human learning by means of the investigation of 
learning in other species, to the direct study of human 
learning in real-world settings. 
2.3 Cognition 
The recent cognitive turn in learning theory is 
reflective of a broader "cognitive revolution" in psy-
chology. This revolution has brought psychology back 
to its pre behaviorist orientation as a cognitive (or 
mental) as well as a behavioral science. In the 
early days of scientific psychology, the focus upon 
human mentality was represented by Herman Ebb-
inghaus (1885). Ebbinghaus's classic work on human 
learning and memory, first published in 1885, was 
distinguished by its invention and use of non-
sense syllables (as well as poetry) as the material 
that he himself memorized in order to study the fac-
tors involved in remembering and forgetting. 
Ebbinghaus's work initiated a long tradition of 
research on the rote learning of verbal items. Unfor-
tunately, many of the explanatory concepts gen-
erated by this tradition are no longer tenable (see 
Cofer 1979). 
Although the Ebbinghaus tradition extended 
through the behaviorist era (c. 1920-55), it was only 
in the later 1950s that modern cognitive psychology 
began to emerge. Miller's (1956) famous article on 
the limits of the human capacity for processing infor-
mation was an important stimulus. After surveying a 
wide range of psychological phenomena not typically 
treated together, he concluded that an individual's 
ability to distinguish stimuli, phonemes, numbers, 
and other items reached a significant threshold on or 
around "the magical number seven." Either learning 
or the design of our nervous system, he inferred, 
"keeps our channel capacities in this general range" 
(p. 86). 
"Channel capacities" was a concept being used at 
that time by several British investigators, including 
Colin Cherry and Donald Broadbent, who were dev-
eloping a new information-processing approach to 
psychology. This approach grew out of applied psy-
chological research begun during the Second World 
War, and it was given an influential expression in 
Broadbent's Perception and Communication (1958). 
A huge amount of theoretical and empirical work 
has been done since that time on "information pro-
cessing" (see Lachman et al. 1979). This line of 
research also draws upon cybernetic theory and com-
munication theory. It is still very much alive, being 
continually refueled by on-going developments in 
computer science. 
Also in the 1950s Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 
published A Study of Thinking (1956), which broke 
new ground regarding experimental methodology as 
well as the formation and acquisition of concepts. 
Treating their subjects as active, constructive prob-
lem solvers rather than passive reactors to stimuli, 
they asked them how they had gone about their tasks 
of ~lassifying and categorizing stimuli. Based upon 
then subjects' experimental responses and their 
retrospective reports, they concluded that the best 
explanation for the overall patterns of their subjects' 
res~onses was provided by the "strategies" these 
subjects had employed. In other words, they sug-
~es!e~ that it was not individual stimuli that triggered 
md1v1dual reactions, as a strict behaviorist for-
~u~ation would have led them to believe, but rather 
md1vidual stimuli within the context of a particular 
cognitive framework. 
From these and other sources, the cognitive rev-
oluti.on in psychology came about. The actual 
coming-of-age of cognitive psychology is often dated 
from the publication of Neisser's text on Cognitive 
Psychology (1967). Since then, the literature has 
grown exponentially. A sense of this growth can be 
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garnered from a perusal of some of the major 
journals founded in little over a decade: Cognitive 
Psychology (1970), Cognition (1971 ), Memory and 
Cognition (1973), Cognitive Science (1977), Cog-
nitive Therapy and Research (1977), and Brain and 
Cognition (1982). In addition, most of the older 
psychology journals have been "cognitivized" in one 
way or another. In sum, psychology has gone 
thoroughly cognitive, as it once went thoroughly 
behavioral. 
2.4 Motivation 
Whether psychology has been cognitive or behavioral 
in orientation has made little difference as regards 
the psychology of motivation. In either case, the 
"motor" dimension of psychological phenomena has 
been problematic for the discipline. It is small 
wonder, then, that Freudian psychology has had an 
appeal even among those who are most critical of it 
(e.g., see Watson 1916b). By putting motivation 
front and center in psychoanalysis, Freud (1916-17) 
made it a fundamental rather than a secondary con-
cern of twentieth-century theories of personality and 
psychotherapy (e.g., Murray 1938). Relatedly, 
McDougall's (1923) "hormic psychology" empha-
sized the role of instinctual motives, thus fore-
shadowing later research in both animal and human 
ethology (see Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989). 
Other psychologists have investigated motivation, 
not as instinctual, but as drive, bodily need, stimu-
lation, incentive, and neural excitation; and still 
others have pointed out that external, distant stimuli 
(such as strange objects) can motivate spontaneous 
fear or exploratory behavior. The latter reaction 
suggests that organisms may opt, under certain con-
ditions, to seek increased sensory and cognitive 
stimulation rather than decreased arousal or tension 
reduction. 
Yet another concern has been intrinsic motivation: 
the apparent tendency of humans to act for such 
"internal rewards" as the pleasure involved in the 
activity itself, the sense of intellectual challenge, 
the satisfaction of curiosity, and the achievement or 
mastery of a task. Following Bandura (1977a) and 
others, there is still a good deal of work to do in this 
area. 
Similarly, there is much to do regarding so-called 
social motivation. Although many of the needs speci-
fied by Murray and his associates (1938) fall into this 
category, it was Harlow's (1958) research on attach-
ment behavior among rhesus monkeys that brought 
this dimension of motivation to the attention of many 
psychologists. Subsequent work on "script theory" 
by Tomkins (1979) and others, though aimed pri-
marily at an understanding of emotional expression, 
also has implications for social motivation. 
At the other end of the spectrum, biological 
research has continued to reveal the biological sub-
strates and limitations of motivation (see Grossman 
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1979). Of particular interest has been the work begun 
by J M Delgado, W W Roberts, and Neal Miller, 
which has attempted to determine how learning can 
be motivated by the electrical stimulation of the 
brain. This research led to the notion of "pleasure 
centers" in the brain that may account for the 
reinforcement of learning and to continuing research 
on "self-stimulation" as a central basis of motivation. 
This latter research, in turn, has drawn attention to 
the "natural opiates" in the brain (such as dopamine), 
the release of which may similarly account for motiv-
ation (see Wise and Rompre 1989). 
Clearly, there has been a lively history of thought 
and investigation regarding human and animal motiv-
ation, yet as noted previously, motivation has been 
problematic for psychologists. This is no less true at 
the present time, when the rise of cognitive psy-
chology seems to be correlated with a decline of 
interest in motivation (see Hilgard 1987 pp. 378-81). 
However, the need to explain the "pushes" and 
"pulls" of thought, emotion, and action seems certain 
to bring the pendulum swinging back again, 
especially if some useful, empirically testable, inte-
grative approach to motivation is discovered. 
2.5 Emotion 
The picture regarding the study of emotion is very 
similar. Although virtually everyone will agree that 
emotions are vitally significant in human experience, 
they have proven somewhat elusive as objects of 
study. Perhaps the easiest way to convey the range 
of current approaches is to categorize emotions into 
those pertaining to the body, to the mind, and to 
culture. 
The classic bodily approach is best represented by 
Cannon (1927), who tried to specify a physiological 
mechanism that could account for emotion defined 
as the perception and feeling of bodily changes. 
Research along this line subsequently gave way to a 
revival of Darwin's (1872) expression theory, which 
focuses upon emotions as inherited bodily 
expressions (smiles, frowns, stares, etc.) that have 
helped species survive. On-going cross-cultural 
research along this line has led Ekman and his associ-
ates (1987) to the conclusion that there are six basic 
facial expressions of emotion-anger, disgust, fear, 
happiness, sadness, and surprise-that are truly uni-
versal. Related to this research are studies that sug-
gest that the facial muscles are linked to the 
autonomic nervous system, through which breathing, 
heart rate, and other vital dimensions of emotion 
are controlled. Finally, there is now a considerable 
amount of work focused on the role of hormones, 
particularly epinephrine and norepinephrine, which 
clearly influence the body's state of arousal. 
The cognitive approach to emotion has received 
considerable attention in recent decades. Much of 
this attention has stemmed from the two-factor 
theory proposed by Schachter and Singer (1962). 
2142 
According to this theory, the experience of an emo-
tion depends upon the feeling of physiological 
arousal plus a cognitive interpretation of that arousal. 
If this is so, the same physiological response could 
provide the substrate for two different emotional 
experiences, depending upon how a person labeled 
that response. Although the original experimental 
evidence for this theory has been difficult to replicate, 
subsequent research has shown that cognition does 
play a significant role in emotional life. For instance, 
it now seems clear that ways of thinking can influence 
the intensity of emotions and that cognitive values 
are associated with the range of emotions that people 
are likely to experience. Though much research 
remains to be done, it seems s.afe to say that emotions 
cannot be separated from the rest of mental life 
(Frijda 1988). 
The cultural approach to emotion has typically 
tried to differentiate those emotions and emotional 
expressions that are specific to particular cultures 
from those that seem to be universal (Ekman et al. 
1987). While all cultures distinguish positive emo-
tions (such as admiration, amusement, joy, and love) 
from negative emotions (such as fear, hatred, shame, 
and sorrow), there are many cultural variations as 
regards the objects of emotion (the things one feels 
emotional about), the situations in which emotions 
are felt, and the ways in which emotions are 
expressed. 
All in all, it seems reasonable to assume that 
insofar as emotions are biologically based, psy-
chologists are well advised to seek universal factors; 
and insofar as they are cognitive and social con-
structions, psychologists had better attend to his-
torical and cultural factors. As noted elsewhere in 
this article, such tension between the universal, on 
the one hand, and the historical and cultural, on the 
other, is a typical characteristic of psychology in 
general. As in other areas of the discipline, it poses 
a central challenge for future research on emotion. 
2.6 Development 
Developmental psychology is an integrative area 
that cuts across the entire spectrum of psychology. 
Virtually every aspect of psychological functioning 
-ranging from psychoneurological functioning 
through cognitive, emotional, and behavioral func-
tioning-changes systematically over time, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. Developmental psy-
chologists try to describe and explain the regularities 
associated with such changes, frequently relating 
experiences in one period of life with developmental 
patterns in another. 
In its earliest days, developmental psychology 
focused upon maturational studies of animal and 
human-infant development, and upon the motor, 
cognitive, and characterological development of chil-
dren. Hilgard (1987) has provided a useful overview 
of the history of the field, including the major longi-
tudinal studies that have contributed to the relatively 
recent emergence of a more complete, life-span 
approach to human development. Although child 
psychology remains the largest subfield of devel-
opmental psychology, a great deal of attention is now 
devoted to adolescence, adulthood, and aging (see 
Datan et al. 1987, Petersen 1988). 
When one surveys the history of developmental 
psychology, many individuals-Alfred Binet, G 
Stanley Hall, James Mark Baldwin, Arnold Gesell, 
Erik Erikson, and many others-deserve mention, 
but if one person symbolizes the emergence of this 
subfield into prominence since the 1950s, it would be 
Jean Piaget. The work of this Swiss psychologist, 
extending from the 1920s through the 1970s (see 
Gruber and Voneche 1977), revolutionized the study 
of cognitive development and provided one of the 
major stimuli to the study of both cognition and 
development as alternatives to the behavioristic focus 
on certain prescribed forms of objective conduct. 
Also, his hypothesis that there are universal stages 
of development has posed both promise and chal-
lenge to a generation of psychologists, so that even 
non-Piagetian research owes a great deal to his inspi-
ration. 
In addition to cognitive development, linguistic 
development has received much attention over the 
past century, and especially over the past several 
decades. Falling between the extremes of contingent 
"verbal behavior" (Skinner 1957) and innate "trans-
formational generative grammar" (Chomsky 1957), 
the field of psycholinguistics has spawned a variety 
of research traditions that have tried to account for 
the nature and development of language. Given the 
critical importance of language to humans, to other 
animals, and (now) to machines, this will inevitably 
remain an area of primary concern. Not surprisingly, 
psychologists have tried to use computers to generate 
an understanding of language, but with limited suc-
cess (Schank and Rieger 1974). 
There has also been a good deal of research on 
social development, starting with "bonding" or 
"attachment" in infants (see Ainsworth 1979) and 
including such topics as "sex typing" (see Maccoby 
1980). While experience plays a large role in such 
processes, it seems clear that certain internal factors 
are also involved in social development. At the begin-
ning of the 1990s, a great deal of research on the 
biological foundations and constraints on social dev-
elopment is going on, and it promises to continue 
into the future. In this research, the amount of devel-
opmental variance due to "nature" and the amount 
due to "nurture" are likely to remain of focal interest. 
2. 7 Personality 
To many nonpsychologists, the study of human per-
sonality is what psychology is-or should be-all 
about. But in fact, personality was a relative late-
comer to the map of twentieth-century psychology 
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(beginning around the time of Allport 1937), and it 
has never enjoyed the unqualified support of the 
majority of scientific psychologists. This is at least 
partially due to the fact that an understanding of 
"personality" in all its facets demands truly inter-
disciplinary study. At one end of the spectrum, 
biology has had an increasing amount to say about 
personality in recent years (e.g., Buss 1991); at the 
other end, cultural anthropology and other human-
istic disciplines have contributed significantly to the 
elucidation of the cultural context and historical vari-
ation of human personality (e.g., Carrithers et al. 
1985). Such a wide-ranging topic, with a variety of 
dimensions, is indeed difficult to pin down once and 
for all. 
It is not only the biological/cultural dimension 
that challenges personality psychologists. Instigated 
largely by Sigmund Freud and his followers, psy-
chologists have also been deeply interested in the 
unconscious/conscious dimension of personality. 
Indeed, much of twentieth-century personality the-
ory and research has taken its cue from psycho-
analytic assumptions and concerns. The work of 
Murray and associates (1938) represents a blending 
of these assumptions and concerns with some of the 
methods that have come to typify United States 
personality psychology. Many psychologists have fol-
lowed in this tradition. 
A different tradition of theory and research has 
focused upon personality types and traits. In a very 
real way, this approach-whether keying upon global 
personality types or specific personality traits-is an 
updated version of age-old common sense 
psychology. It has flourished from the start of the 
scientific study of psychology right up to the present 
time (Funder 1991). 
Throughout much of the middle part of the twen-
tieth century, especially in the United States, a 
behavioristic approach to "personality" (defined as 
the typical behavior patterns of an individual) was 
also pursued-or at least it was presumed to be 
the proper approach-by many psychologists (e.g., 
Dollard and Miller 1950). Although it has failed to 
eclipse alternative theories, it has led to an increased 
sensitivity regarding the importance of "situations" 
and the utility of thinking of personality in terms 
of an "interaction" between innate tendencies and 
situational factors. In recent times, social learning 
theory and other forms of cognitive behaviorism have 
expanded earlier, restrictive forms of behavioral per-
sonality theory (see Pervin 1985). 
Such expanded forms of behavioral psychology are 
at least partially a result of the criticism of behaviorist 
approaches on the part of so-called "humanistic psy-
chologists." In-the United States, these psychologists 
(e.g., Rogers 1961) have played an important role in 
directing attention to the active, knowing, valuing, 
and intending aspects of the human self, aspects 
that fell outside the normal purview of the more 
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traditional physiological, psychoanalytic, and be-
haviorist approaches to personality functioning. 
As United States psychology has become more 
inclusive in its conceptual framework over the past 
few decades, thus permitting cognition and con-
sciousness to play central roles (again) in the 
description and explanation of personal dynamics, 
the field of personality psychology has become richer, 
more diverse, and more complex. Buss and Cantor 
(1989) have gathered contributions reflecting recent 
trends and emerging directions in the field. Some of 
these trends and directions-including the trying out 
of new units of analysis, looking for new measures 
of coherence, and developing new means of assess-
ment-are especially promising insofar as they indi-
cate that personality psychologists are moving 
beyond their former excessive reliance upon empiri-
cal studies of college students using self-report meas-
ures administered in single-occasion laboratory or 
classroom settings. Such studies are unlikely to yield 
nonobvious, important truths about human per-
.sonality. 
2.8 Other Areas-and Beyond 
Psychology has spawned many other subfields, 
including social psychology (see Social Psychology 
[Vol. 3, Sect. V]), abnormal psychology, psycho-
logical assessment, educational psychology, industrial 
and organizational psychology, human factors psy-
chology, forensic psychology, political psychology, 
and counseling and clinical psychology. Most of these 
latter subfields have an "applied" focus and draw 
upon the "pure" research conducted within the 
subfields treated in the above sections. It is worth 
noting, however, that these latter subfields (and 
others like them) account for the vast majority of 
activity engaged in by psychologists. 
In addition to these subfields, a number of new 
"interfield" disciplines have grown up around the 
edges of the map of psychology. Together with physi-
ologists, neurologists, and clinical pathologists, for 
instance, psychologists have created the booming 
field of neuroscience, or brain science (Kandel 1982). 
This new field is necessarily interdisciplinary and 
collaborative, given the amount of knowledge and 
various kinds of methodological sophistication 
needed to pursue it. As Thompson and Robinson 
(1979) have noted, at the very least one now needs 
a neurophysiologist, a neuroanatomist, a neuro-
chemist, and experts in neuropharmacology and 
neuroendocrinology, not to mention behavioral 
scientists, in order to mount a contemporary program 
in what was once physiological psychology. In their 
assessment, the trend is clearly toward neuroscience 
and away from psychobiology per se. 
Similar developments have Jed to the development 
of behavioral genetics and cognitive science, fields in 
which scientists outside psychology play a major role 
alongside psychologists. Combining modern genetics 
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with the study of behavior, behavioral genetics inves-
tigates the influence of genetic endowment upon 
an individual's behavior. This new field is rapidly 
becoming a leading area of inquiry (see Plomin and 
Rende 1991). Cognitive science is even better known 
and is probably even more fully populated, having 
developed over the past decades at the intersection 
of anthropology, artificial intelligence, computer 
science, linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, and 
cognitive psychology (Gardner 1987). Interestingly, 
this relatively new "interdiscipline" is already being 
challenged by the even newer "connectionist" move-
ment (see Hunt 1989 p. 625). 
Although each of these collaborative enterprises 
still needs the theoretical and empirical grounding 
provided by more traditional psychology, it is not 
clear that psychology will emerge whole from its 
participation in these fields. As discussed below, it is 
possible that psychology will be dismembered in the 
coming decades. At the same time, however, it seems 
probable that recently invigorated subfields-such as 
crosscultural psychology, environmental psychology, 
evolutionary psychology, and health psychology-
will more than fill any vacated spaces on psychology's 
map and in psychology's textbooks. 
3. The Methodological Values of Psychology 
Methods of many sorts have been used for millennia 
by scholars, scientists, and their predecessors, but 
since the 1880s psychologists have exhibited a 
stronger than usual tendency to focus their attention 
upon methodology, prescribing and institutionalizing 
the proper, legitimate techniques that are to be used 
by practitioners of their discipline. Indeed, the estab-
lishment and reliance upon methods of observation, 
experiment, measurement, analysis, and theory con-
struction have been characteristic features of scien-
tific and professional psychology in the United States 
right from the start. 
Outside the United States, reliance upon these 
same prescribed methods, particularly upon empiri-
cal data-gathering and quantitative analysis, has 
tended both to lag and to emerge in a more atten-
uated form. Insofar as the application of these 
methods outside the United States constitutes a form 
of imitative behavior, it can be contrasted with the 
frequent and sometimes virulent criticisms of United 
States "methodism" on the part of non-American 
psychologists. Such criticisms, it should be noted, 
have implications for the ways in which the subject 
matters of psychology are construed (see Shotter 
1975). 
Although sometimes overemphasized, the meth-
odological orientation that has typified twentieth-
century psychology, primarily in the United States, 
is (in its less extreme manifestations) one of the 
discipline's glories. Even some of those who have 
been critical of the shortsighted, rote, and theor-
etically inconsequential manner in which psychol-
ogists have sometimes applied their methods believe 
that these methods have now been developed to a 
point where they can assist psychologists in elu-
cidating the relationships and structures still hidden 
within or behind psychological phenomena (Luce 
1985). Whether this is so or not, the belief that it is 
so-the belief in the value of prescribed methods-
is clearly a defining feature of the culture or ethos of 
the discipline. Indeed, trust in the critical importance 
of articulated methods is so deeply schooled into 
psychologists that even psychological practitioners, 
who may be critical of scientific methods, tend 
strongly to accept the need for prescribed clinical and 
applied methods. In fact, professional certification in 
any number of fields depends upon the assimilation 
of such methods. 
The value that is accorded to methods in United 
States psychology derives partially from the disci-
pline's historical association with logical positivism. 
After relying previously upon a naive form of empiri-
cism, as reflected in Watson's (1913) behavioristic 
manifesto, United States psychologists came under 
the influence of logical positivism in the 1930s. 
Although the assumptions fostered by this phil-
osophy of science have been subjected to an exten-
sive critique (see Toulmin and Leary 1985), they still 
represent many of the operative values in the disci-
pline. Objectivity defined as intersubjective agree-
ment, reliability defined as replicability, precision 
defined as quantitative measurement, and validity 
defined as anchored or tautological description: these 
are some of the methodological hallmarks of modern 
psychology. So too is knowledge defined as pre-
diction and control, though this is part of 
psychology's social-reform legacy rather than its 
association with logical positivism. This latter hall-
mark, too, has been criticized-for example, in favor 
of a definition of knowledge as a means of under-
standing and change rather than as a means of pre-
diction and control (Gergen 1982)-but many 
psychologists continue to espouse a rather narrow 
utilitarian view of psychological knowledge. 
In the aftermath of the behaviorist era in 
psychology, which began to fade in the 1950s, most 
observers have reported that the backbone of psy-
chological theory and practice has been undergoing 
metamorphosis. However, it is still far from certain 
what the methodological and epistemological pos-
ture-or postures-of psychology will be in the 
future. Though it has been loosening its meth-
odological strictures, it seems unlikely that the disci-
pline of psychology will become flexible enough to 
allow its theorists and practitioners to generate new, 
broadly encompassing visions of its subject matters 
comparable in scope and in historical significance to 
those generated by modern psychology's pioneers, 
who were less fettered by methodological fas-
tidiousness. Interestingly, the theoretical visions of 
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the discipline's early pioneers continue to orient 
much of the discipline and profession, albeit with 
diminishing returns, down to the present day (Loe-
vinger 1985). 
The future of psychology seems to promise, and 
to depend upon, an increasing number of local met-
aphors ("models") and a decreasing number of 
universal metaphors ("paradigms"), more domain-
specific theories and fewer overarching syntheses; 
but then, who would have predicted that the recent 
computer and information-processing metaphors 
would reach across so many domains of psychology 
(see Hoffman et al. 1990)? Perhaps the evolving 
cognitive science of recent years, founded upon 
metaphors that are coextensive with the field's tech-
nological and methodological tools, will provide a 
megatheory capable of connecting and holding 
together a variety of subfields in psychology. But 
probably not, for the extent of cognitive science's 
reach seems directly related to its ignoring many 
supposedly irrelevant details that contribute to the 
concrete reality of everyday psychological experi-
ence. However deep the methodological imperative 
within the culture of modern psychology, the call of 
concrete experience will almost certainly continue to 
intrude at opportune (and inopportune) moments, 
directing psychologists' attention to the insufficiency 
of any single metaphor or model and to the cor-
relative need for fresh perspectives and novel 
approaches (see Leary 1990). 
4. The Social and Cultural Setting of Psychology 
Awareness of the need for fresh perspectives and 
novel approaches in psychology has been spurred by 
the relatively recent rise in sensitivity, among many 
psychologists, regarding the socio-cultural embed-
dedness of their discipline and profession. (This 
awareness is expressed by many of the contributors 
to a volume-Koch and Leary 1985-that contains 
numerous retrospective assessments of the first cen-
tury of psychology.) As psychologists have become 
more conscious and less defensive about the social, 
cultural, and other "nonrational" factors that influ-
ence the development of psychological theory and 
practice, they have begun to deal more directly, 
again, with questions of ideology and value, fre-
quently dropping the presumption (fostered by naive 
empiricism and logical positivism alike) that science 
can and should be culture-free (or value-free) in any 
complete and radical way. 
Not only regarding the application and utilization 
of psychology, but also regarding the processes of 
psychological o~servation, measurement, and theory 
construction, questions about the cognitive frame-
works, social purposes, and ultimate values of psy-
chology (and psychologists) have come to the fore. 
It seems certain that neither the social origins nor 
the social consequences of psychology have ever been 
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more clearly recognized and so deeply probed (see 
Buss 1979). In the area of theory, such awareness 
has enfranchized a "social constructionist move-
ment" in the discipline (see Gergen 1985), while in 
the area of application, it has underscored the extent 
to which psychology has been so influential that it 
tends to "make itself true-or false" by means of the 
effects it has upon individuals, society, and culture 
(Macintyre 1985). 
Among the issues that have arisen within this con-
text, those pertaining to the nature of the relationship 
between the sociopolitical ideology of the discipline, 
on the one hand, and the problem selection, data-
gathering, theoretical interpretations, and practical 
applications of psychologists, on the other, are surely 
among the more sensitive. In this regard, recent 
United States scholarship (e.g., Sampson 1978) has 
echoed earlier scholarship by non-American critics 
of United States psychology (e.g., Holzkamp 1972). 
It is reasonable to assume that psychologists will 
continue to give serious attention to these kinds of 
issues in the years ahead. 
A solid foundation for such scholarly attention has 
been laid, over the past few decades, by a new 
generation of historians of psychology. Building 
upon the earlier work of such individuals as Edwin 
G Boring and Robert I Watson, Sr, these more recent 
scholars-frequently trained as psychologists but 
drawn to historical analysis by their puzzlement 
about the status and prospects of the discipline-have 
generated scholarly societies, journals, and graduate 
programs as well as an extensive new literature on 
the history of psychology (see Hilgard et al. 1991). 
A representative sample of this new historiography 
can be seen in volumes edited by Ash and Woodward 
(1987) and Morawski (1988). 
What has emerged, in general, from recent his-
torical scholarship on the discipline and profession of 
psychology is a view of psychology's embeddedness 
within the stream of history and culture. Rather than 
something destined to evolve as it has because of the 
nature of things and the processes of human knowing, 
psychology has come to be seen as the product of 
many individuals working within particular social 
contexts toward goals framed by the larger currents 
of cultural history. For instance, if United States 
psychology has assumed aspects of the role once 
played in higher education by intellectual and moral 
philosophy, if it has tended to generalize from male-
centered experience to supposedly universal truths, 
if some of its theories have been reflective of the 
religious traditions within which their proponents 
were raised, and if the metaphors that have inspired 
its theoretical constructions and oriented its practical 
routines have been assimilated from its surrounding 
culture, these facts are simply indicative of 
psychology's distinctive history within one particular 
social and cultural milieu (see Leary 1987). 
In other social and cultural settings, psychology 
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has assumed somewhat-and sometimes drasti-
cally-different forms. Not only the sociology of the 
discipline (its training procedures, modes of com-
munication, professional roles, social status, reward 
systems, and so on), but also its subject areas, theor-
etical structures, and practical applications have 
differed substantially from one country to another 
(Rosenzweig 1991, Sexton and Hogan 1990). 
Although Canadian psychology has been very similar 
to United States psychology, the various national 
traditions of European and Soviet psychology have 
been markedly different in their definitions, 
methods, and concerns, and they have prepared their 
adherents for very different social roles. More dis-
tinctive still, the psychologies of the Third World 
have been developed into their own indigenous 
shapes for the sake of their own individual aims (e.g., 
see Ardila 1982). 
The recognition of this cultural as well as historical 
variation is important, for it suggests the need for 
greater awareness-and more critical analysis-of 
the cultural demands and historical trends that influ-
ence the perception, thought, and behavior of psy-
chologists. On a very practical level, it also suggests 
that aspiring psychologists should supplement the 
necessarily technical aspects of their education with 
broader cultural and humanistic studies. Indeed, the 
need for liberal education on the part of aspiring 
psychologists, including the need for historical and 
multicultural education, is something to which psy-
chologists and educators should give serious atten-
tion. 
The dawning awareness of psychology's embed-
dedness in time and space does not discredit all 
of its previous discoveries nor does it fatally jeopar-
dize its prospects, but it warrants greater sensitivity 
and responsiveness to the sociocultural context of 
psychology, and psychological phenomena. As one 
non-American psychologist has put it, students and 
practitioners of the discipline should come to under-
stand that psychology has been 
a discipline cultivated mainly in the industrialized coun-
tries (in the "First World") and not so much m other 
nations. Contemporary psychology is largely an Anglo-
Saxon discipline that shares the values and assumptions 
of English-speaking countries, particularly of the United 
States; some of these values and conceptions seem to be 
alien to [Third World] way[s] of thinking. (Ardila 1982 
p. 120) 
Increased recognition of the cultural dimensions of 
psychological theory and practice would underscore 
one of the major challenges for the psychologists of 
the future, namely, to draw the line, more accurately, 
between what is truly "universal" and what is in fact 
"historical" and "cultural." In a world that promises 
to be increasingly interconnected, uncovering the 
historical and cultural dimensions of psychological 
phenomena-and of psychology itself-may be just 
as important as discovering what is universal in 
human and animal nature. 
5. Conclusion: General Trends and Prospects 
Until fairly recently, most psychologists expected 
their discipline to develop in a progressive, cumu-
lative manner toward an ever-increasing systematic 
unity. Although this ideal has been promulgated in 
the twentieth century chiefly by the logical positivist 
philosophy of science, it has by no means been the 
goal of that intellectual movement alone. In fact, it 
was a clearly articulated goal of the empiricist and 
idealist philosophies of science that dominated the 
nineteenth century; it is still espoused by many scien-
tific psychologists (e.g., Staats 1981); it has been no 
less the goal of some recent advocates of a human-
scientific approach to psychology (e.g., Giorgi 1970); 
and it has even been claimed as a fait accompli 
by some contemporary psychologists (e.g., Kimble 
1989). 
Nonetheless, a great many psychologists have 
come to believe that their discipline has not devel-
oped progressively toward a coherent system of 
thought and practice. On the contrary, they believe 
that psychological knowledge has been noncumu-
lative and that the discipline of psychology has 
become increasingly fragmented rather than unified. 
In a volume devoted to a representative survey of 
the first century of psychology, for instance, Gibson 
(1985) concluded that the knowledge gained over 
the last hundred years in his field of sensory and 
perceptual psychology has been insignificant as well 
as incoherent; Gleitman (1985) wondered if psy-
chology has really progressed much beyond what 
Wundt knew and supposed about cognition; de 
Rivera (1985) pointed out that the psychology of 
emotion has not only become isolated from the other 
subfields of psychology but has even become intern-
ally fractured into a variety of sub-subfields; Loe-
vinger (1985) suggested that in some ways there may 
actually have been regression in the study of human 
character; and Kendler (1985) admitted that 
although behavioristic psychology has made some 
progress, it has accomplished far less than anticipated 
just four decades ago. 
In addition to its noncumulative development, psy-
~hology's fragmentation has received astute analysis 
m the work of Koch (1976), who believes that "psy-
chological studies" would be a better title for the very 
loose federation oftopics, methods, and investigators 
that constitute what is now called "psychology." The 
basic insight underlying Koch's argument for this 
redesignation of psychology, which was considered 
~n extremely radical argument when first advanced, 
is now accepted by many mainstream psychologists. 
For instance, Hilgard (1987), a former president of 
the American Psychological Association, concludes 
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his magisterial historical survey of the discipline with 
the observation that: 
the idea of a unified science of psychology may be more 
an esthetic ideal suggesting harmony and a common 
front in facing the other sciences than a practical goal 
for psychological science. Psychology can be conceived 
as a large family of many psychologies, unified by social 
practice and the disciplinary structure of universities. 
(Hilgard 1987 p. 803) 
And yet another, more recent president of the 
American Psychological Association, William Bevan 
(1986), has argued not only that "psychology is a 
nonlinear discipline," but that it is not really "a 
simple coherent discipline but a collectivity of studies 
of varied cast." It seems to him that "the character 
of psychology is seen in the rapid proliferation of 
rather narrowly focused and increasingly insular 
intellectual communities" (pp. 367-68). Even though 
the work of these relatively isolated groups of psy-
chologists has led to many "exciting developments" 
and even "brilliant individual advances" of the disci-
pline, Bevan believes that psychology now "faces a 
critical period in its development as a coherent body 
of knowledge." This crisis, he notes, is related as 
much to "the sociology, the psychology, and the 
economics of the academic enterprise" as to the 
"flawed intellectual character" of the discipline itself 
(pp. 366--67). 
While the sociology, psychology, and economics 
of the academic enterprise-and their influence upon 
the development of psychology and other disci-
plines-might be pondered with profit by those in 
higher education, the intellectual challenge of simply 
comprehending, much less integrating, all that is 
going on in the various areas of psychology is per-
haps reason enough to suggest that the future may 
witness a deconstruction-or dismemberment-of 
"psychology." (Although the internal fragmentation 
of psychology has been going on for quite some time, 
its various fragments are still encompassed within the 
typical map of psychology.) Whether or not psy-
chology is to be dismembered, however, it is clear 
that the age of grand unifying theories, methods, 
applications, and programs in psychology-which 
crested in the 1930s and 1940s-is long past. 
Leaders in higher education may find it daunting 
to contemplate the potential metamorphoses in psy-
chology's future. The scenarios for the discipline's 
reconstruction are at least as numerous as the recipes 
for its deconstruction. But, in fact, it is unlikely that 
academic psychology as we know it will change its 
institutional form abruptly and radically, given the 
economic forces impacting upon the academy. In 
the short run," the various fields of psychology will 
probably continue to move along their current 
trajectories, sometimes connecting with develop-
ments in other disciplines and forming new inter-
disciplinary enterprises that overlap the bound-
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aries of psychology. Whether or not any of these new 
enterprises will eventually become fully independent 
academic disciplines, as cognitive science and 
neuroscience are trying to do today, it seems likely 
that much of the important work on traditional psy-
chological topics and concerns is likely to be done at 
the interdisciplinary matrices linking psychology and 
other fields. 
Looking toward this necessarily uncertain future, 
fully aware that the developments of the past century 
have fallen short of fulfilling all the hopes and prom-
ise that accompanied the establishment of the "new 
psychology," it is nonetheless palpably clear that 
most psychologists have retained a commitment to, 
and confidence in, their own particular portion of 
psychology. Though sometimes dissatisfied and 
impatient with the progress of their discipline or 
subdiscipline, their persistent desire for better theory 
and practice (as illustrated in the contributions to 
Koch and Leary 1985) is perhaps the discipline's 
greatest strength. Though often searching for new 
directions, they are far from ready to give up the 
quest begun a century ago by Wundt, James, and 
their contemporaries. Whether they are interested 
in consciousness, mind, or behavior, psychological 
theory or therapeutic practice, pure science or public 
policy, or any other domain of psychology, today's 
psychologists have plenty to do, as will tomorrow's, 
throughout the world. They may do it inside or 
outside the current boundaries of the discipline and 
inside or outside the academy, but one thing seems 
certain: their education within the academy is likely 
to spell a large measure of their success. 
See also: Social Psychology (Vol. 3, Sect. V) 
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